Turkey secured the ratification of the 2019 maritime agreement from the parliament of eastern Libya as well, establishing new realities in the Eastern Mediterranean and reinforcing its claims against Greece. On October 20, the House of Representatives in Benghazi, aligned with Khalifa Haftar, unanimously approved the agreement it had rejected in 2020. In this manner, both rival political authorities in Libya now recognize the maritime delimitation promoted by Ankara, with the baseline passing between Crete and Cyprus. This development triggers severe concern in Athens while generating risks for the operations of international oil companies. Despite the fact that major corporations are not expected to proceed with exploration in disputed waters, Turkey now acquires legal leverage to challenge any energy project it deems in violation of its claims. The area east of the 26th meridian is considered a particularly critical flashpoint, where potential Greek exploratory activities could spark renewed Greek-Turkish tension.
Shift in Libyan dynamics — How the agreement was ratified
Ratification of the agreement became possible following the removal of the eastern Libyan parliamentary speaker, who had blocked its progress for years. Aguila Saleh, a close interlocutor of Cairo and speaker of the Benghazi parliament for 12 years, had refused to bring the relevant memorandum forward for ratification. On October 6, lawmakers removed him from his post and elected Al-Salhin Abdelnabi al-Obeidi, who chaired the Libya-Turkey parliamentary friendship committee. The camp of Saddam Haftar, son of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, played a leading role in these developments. Ankara had prepared the ground since July by signing an agreement with Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA), covering military installations, surveillance systems, and officer training in eastern Libya. On the day of the vote, Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin was present in Tripoli. He thanked Abdulhamid Dbeibah, the new parliamentary speaker, and Saddam Haftar for securing the ratification.
Ankara's political bargaining with Saddam Haftar
Behind the maritime agreement lies a broader effort to realign political power in Libya, according to analysts. Saddam Haftar aims to emerge as president of a unified Libya, encompassing both the eastern and western sides of the country. A plan promoted by the US to merge the two rival governing structures reportedly foresees retaining Abdulhamid Dbeibah as prime minister in Tripoli and elevating Saddam Haftar to the leadership of the Presidential Council. According to Jalel Harchaoui, the United Arab Emirates supports the plan; however, Turkey has not committed to backing it. The presence of Turkish troops in western Libya gives Ankara the capability to torpedo the deal. Harchaoui contends that Turkish officials clearly conveyed this message to Saddam Haftar, who reportedly proceeded with the ratification of the Turkey-Libya memorandum to secure Turkish support for the American plan. In other words, Ankara holds an effective veto over developments and reportedly demanded concessions upfront. Any future unified government in Libya will inherit the maritime agreement, whereas Turkey has undertaken no corresponding public commitment. Tarek Megerisi, of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), concurs with this assessment, arguing that Saddam Haftar "is using parliament to try to curry favor with the Turks." For her part, Claudia Gazzini of the Crisis Group points out that Turkish support for a Saddam Haftar presidency is not guaranteed. Conversely, Oussama Assed, head of the Libya Center for Strategic and Future Studies in Tripoli, estimates that Ankara could ultimately provide full support to the American plan.
Turkey reinforces its claims against Greece
The ratification of the memorandum by both rival Libyan authorities reinforces Ankara's longstanding position that Greek islands in the region do not generate a continental shelf or an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) beyond their territorial waters. This position stands at the core of the Greek-Turkish dispute over maritime delimitation in the Eastern Mediterranean. SETA, a think tank close to the Turkish government, argues that the ratification by Libya strengthens Ankara's negotiating posture in any future delimitation in the Aegean with Greece. In the same context, Turkish analyst Ahmet Erdi Öztürk estimates that Ankara is making the formation of a regional order in the Eastern Mediterranean that excludes Turkey increasingly difficult and costly. Turkish strategy is not limited to Libya. Ankara is pursuing a similar maritime agreement with Syria, attempting to expand its influence across the entire region.
Cyprus in the crosshairs — The plan for an agreement with Syria
The Republic of Cyprus has signed maritime delimitation agreements with Egypt in 2003, Israel in 2010, and Lebanon in November 2025, but not with Syria. Turkey has rejected all three agreements, contending that they fail to account for the claims of Turkish Cypriots. Following the assumption of power in Damascus by Ahmed al-Sharaa, Cypriot officials express fears that Ankara will pursue an agreement with Syria that bypasses the Republic of Cyprus, according to a report by the Cyprus Mail. In August, Turkey announced it is prepared to proceed with exploration and drilling operations off the Syrian coast. Such a development could create new realities in the Eastern Mediterranean, reinforcing Turkish claims and further complicating efforts to delimit maritime zones.
Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt react — UN intervention
On October 26, Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis presented a joint statement in New York on behalf of Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and the European Union. The statement emphasized that the vote in Benghazi "raises serious concerns regarding regional security and stability." On the same day, in Cairo, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres stated that maritime arrangements not complying with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea should not be recognized. Turkey is not a signatory party to this specific convention. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan dismissed the reactions, contending they carry "no legal basis." The confrontation highlights the clash between two differing approaches to maritime delimitation in the region, with Greece, Cyprus, and their allies invoking international law while Ankara seeks to consolidate its own claims through bilateral agreements.
Egypt loses control of eastern Libya
The ratification of the memorandum constitutes a major blow to Egypt, which had maintained strong influence over eastern Libya for years. Cairo had backed Khalifa Haftar's war against the Tripoli government in 2019, while Aguila Saleh served as its primary ally in the Benghazi parliamentary speakership. However, Saleh's removal by Saddam Haftar's camp and the unanimous ratification of the agreement with Turkey demonstrate a shift in the balance of power. The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs characterized the agreement as a "clear violation of Egypt's sovereign rights within its Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf." According to Jalel Harchaoui, the vote proves that Saddam Haftar now feels free to completely ignore Cairo. Relations between Egypt and Haftar had already deteriorated due to the latter's alleged role in supplying Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the paramilitary organization fighting the Egyptian-backed Sudanese army.
Cairo counterattacks via Athens and international law
Egypt is now attempting to react through diplomatic and legal maneuvers. Egyptian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Nader Zaki announced that Cairo is compiling a "comprehensive legal dossier" on the case. On October 26, the Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Greece agreed to advance talks aimed at extending their 2020 maritime delimitation eastward, toward Cyprus. Turkey has also proposed discussing the issue. However, according to Wolfgang Pusztai, a former Austrian defense attaché in Athens, what causes greater concern in Cairo is not so much the maritime agreement itself as the potential establishment of a Turkish military presence in eastern Libya. Such a development could radically alter the balance of power in North Africa and further diminish Egyptian influence.
Oil giants keep distance from disputed zones
Despite significant geopolitical gains for Ankara, the agreement does not imply an immediate commencement of hydrocarbon exploration in the contested maritime zones. Major oil corporations are unlikely to take the risk of investing in areas that Greece, Egypt, and the European Union consider to lie outside the Turkey-Libya delimitation. Claudia Gazzini of the Crisis Group told Agenzia Nova that she does not expect international oil companies to actively pursue exploration or investments in disputed waters. For its part, SETA argues that the exploration blocks covered by the Turkey-Libya agreement do not, for the time being, include the maritime zones disputed with Greece. Turkish state oil company TPAO holds a 40% stake in offshore Block O7, located in a deepwater area approximately 140 kilometers northwest of Benghazi, with Repsol operating the block. At the same time, Chevron holds exploration licenses for four Greek maritime blocks south of Crete. However, the Turkish Ministry of Defense has acknowledged that these specific blocks do not "directly affect our continental shelf." These parameters demonstrate that, at least in this phase, the agreement does not automatically translate into new energy investments for Turkey.
The 26th meridian as a potential flashpoint
The most significant gain for Ankara is that it acquires an additional legal argument to challenge projects it considers to cross the maritime line it promotes. SETA specifically highlights Greek exploratory activities east of the 26th meridian as the point that could trigger Turkish naval deployments. In such a scenario, the risk of a naval incident is considered high. Turkey, moving from a power positioned on the margins of regional maritime arrangements, is now attempting to evolve into a primary arbiter of developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has achieved this by approaching a Libyan political faction that its opponents had once armed against it. The question is whether this diplomatic success will translate into a genuine energy and geopolitical advantage or if it will spark a new cycle of escalation with Greece, Egypt, and Cyprus. In any case, the agreement heightens uncertainty for energy investments in the Eastern Mediterranean and amplifies the risk of the region facing a fresh round of diplomatic and military tensions.
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